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IV.

I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity has changed. While in terms of physics it is still the 60 Hz
120 volt AC movement of electrons in the outer orbit of copper wires, the
business model has altered through state regulations and incentives with
unanticipated legal repercussions. Several key states are indirectly
imposing on their electric sectors a new business model that fundamentally
changes the role of, and financial incentives for, utilities, consumers, and
distributed power generators.
California and key RGGI East Coast states are now beginning to
evaluate whether their regulation of distributed power complies with law
and regulatory principles. States have lost more than a dozen recent suits
against aspects of their models of climate regulation. Exactly a decade
ago, at a Duke Law School forum, I was asked to forecast what would
characterize the U.S. “Power Future” in which I included, inter alia:1








Waning of fossil fuel power.
Shifting to renewable energy and on-site cogeneration.
Increasing EPA regulation of fossil fuels.
Greater centralized importance and change of the transmission
grid.
The importance of proactively addressing climate change at
the state level.
Benefits of dispersed distributed generation.
The importance of state renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
and net metering programs, and the critical distinction for
states to implement these legally.

This Article compares and contrasts state regulatory decisions, programs,
subsidies, and the evolving new business model. Section II examines the
revolutionary role of renewable energy, the critical role of electricity, and
the changing business model. Section III analyzes how various incentives
are being embedded in government programs in many states, how the
incentives or the programs affect the evolving business model, how these
are valued and shift economic impacts, and criticism of the results.

1.

2

Steven Ferrey, Power Future, DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261 (2005).
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Section IV dissects the motivation for the “regulatory play” in the new
business model.
II. MODEL—BEHAVIOR
A. Renewable Power Economics and Traditional Service Model Exit
A big change is ushered in through the technological and cost decline
of wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) distributed generation. The cost of
photovoltaic solar panels has fallen dramatically—a decline from about
$1.90 per watt in 2009 to $0.70 per watt.2 Inverter prices, for the equipment
necessary to convert photovoltaic direct current to alternating current,
have also declined by more than 60% in cost from $0.60 to $1.00 or more per
watt in 2005 to under $0.20watt in 2013.3 This has allowed the solar
photovoltaic markets to grow at an average of more than 40% each year
since 2000:4
As a result of these trends, PV could act as a disruptive technology that challenges the
incumbent players in its industry. Many analysts have forecasted that the
centralized utility model that has served most of the world for over 100 years
could give way to new business operating paradigms. 5

Since 2008, the price of the photovoltaic panels has fallen by 75% and
the pace of solar installations has increased ten times.6 One additional
rooftop solar system was being installed every four minutes in 2013 in the
United States.7 In the United States, there were more than 300,000
“distributed” solar installations installed in 2012, almost all in the 43 net

2. Wilson Rickerson et al., Residential Prosumers—Drivers and Policy Options
(Re-Prosumer), INT’L ENERGY AGENCY-RETD, Sept. 2014, at 9; Jade Jones, Regional PV
Module Pricing Dynamics: What You Need to Know, GREENTECHSOLAR (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/regional-pv-module-pricing-dynamics-whatyou-need-to-know.
3. Id.; Ian Clover, IHS Cuts Global Inverter Market Forecast in Face of Dramatic
Price Drops, PV MAG. (Oct. 16, 2013); Navigant Consulting Inc., A Review of PV Inverter
Technology Cost and Performance Projections, NREL/SR-620-38771, NATIONAL RENEWABLE
ENERGY LABORATORY (2006).
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 12.
6. Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 24, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/
131226-utilities-dispute-net-metering-for-solar/.
7. Id.
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metering states.8 In 2013, two-thirds of solar installations in California
were structured where the homeowner leased the panels rather than
purchased them.9
Much of the innovation responsible for the solar industry’s explosive
growth has been financial rather than technological. Half the U.S.’s solar
capacity, for instance, was installed just in 2012.10 Driving those sales was
the ability of homeowners to avoid the five-figure cost of a photovoltaic
system. Homeowners could lease the system for monthly payments that
often were lower than what they would pay their local utilities.
Anywhere between 75 and 90 percent of all solar systems are now leased
as a result. Regulated utilities today are generally barred from providing
solar photovoltaic units behind the meter on the customers’ properties to
sell to their own customers. Third-party ownership of residential PV
systems has been a dominant business model, with third-party ownership
constituting greater than 80% in Arizona and California.11
The CEOs of six major U.S. utilities estimated that solar will comprise
15% to 20% of their companies’ generation portfolios in 20 years.
Distributed generation creates benefits for the larger energy system.
Generating power on-site avoids energy loss of the transmission and
distribution and can defer transmission capacity upgrade modifications
and distribution costs.12
Grid exodus could become a viable option for residential system owners
in Hawaii before 2020, in California in the early 2020s, and in New York
State in the late 2020s. More southern latitudes could begin to achieve
attractive internal rates of return around 2020.13 In Hawaii, the rapid rise
of distributed PV generation has already overloaded certain distribution
lines resulting in restrictions on new solar PV projects.
Utilities now do not earn a profit on PV distributed generation, which
others own. Some utilities propose that they be allowed to recovery
through rate-base solar on customer rooftops, which very few states now
permit. Certain utilities are going into solar as a separate unregulated
business venture. Dominion Energy recently announced it is divesting its

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Rickerson, supra note 2.
11. GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Assoc., “U.S. Solar Market Insight
Report: Q2 2013,” 2013, available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/ussmi.
12. Rickerson, supra note 3, at 44. Most countries in North America and Europe
experience T&D losses of 4-8%. Id.
13. Id. at 18; Patrick Hummel, Per Lekander, Alberto Gandolfi, Stephen Hunt, &
Ignacio Cossio, The Unsubsidised Solar Revolution, UBS INVESTMENT RESEARCH (2013).
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retail business and that it plans to double down on solar with a 250 mW
development target by 2016.14
The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) launched a regulatory
proceeding to reform the state’s energy industry and regulatory practices.15
B. The Evolving Utility Model
Many recent articles discuss the utility business model and how it is
changing, and even how it must change. 16 Some people in the power
industry think a transition to use decentralized micro-grids could be
revolutionary.17 There is concern that these changes could usher in new
industry architecture, ultimately supplanting the centralized utility grid
with a new decentralized, cellular topology.18 Some argue that utilities
may “go the way of the dinosaurs.”19 Some commenters forecast that
utilities could become more like phone companies in a new era of total
competition.20 However, there are important distinctions. There will
14. Zacks Equity Research, Dominion Multiplies Solar Projects (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/128536/Dominion-Multiplies-Solar-Projects.
15. See New York P.U.C., Case 14-M-0101 Proceeding on Motion of the Commission
in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.
nsf/All/26BE8A93967E604785257CC40066B91A?OpenDocument.
16. Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for
the Modern Era, 26 ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2013 at 35–53; Business Not as Usual: FineTuning Utility Model Won’t Do, 27 ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2014, at 4–5; Fereidoon P.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived To Rethink The Electric Business Model, 25
ELECTRICITY J., Aug.–Sept. 2012, at 65–74; Renewable Energy World Editors, The Big
Question: What Is the Future Utility Business Model? RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Dec.
25, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/12/the-big-questionwhat-is-the-future-utility-business-model; John Downey, Technology will change utility business
model, Duke Energy exec says, CHARLOTTE BUSINESS JOURNAL (July 15, 2014, 3:55 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/energy/2014/07/technology-will-change-utilitybusiness-model-duke.html; David Savenije, How new market entrants are upending the utility
business model: Companies like Google, NRG Energy and Tesla have ‘ambitions to become a
new kind of utility’, U TILITY D IVE (May 12, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/hownew-market-entrants-are-upending-the-utility-business-model/261442/; Corbin Hiar, Business
Model Concerns Undermine Utilities’ Energy Efficiency, Smart Grid Work, SNL POWER
DAILY, Oct. 16, 2012; Tom Tiernan & Herman Wang, Utility Business Model at ‘inflection
point’ as Technology, Smart Grid Change the Game, ELECTRIC UTILITY WK., Oct. 8, 2012.
17. Than, supra note 6.
18. Michael T. Burr, Microgrid Milestones, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY (Dec.
19, 2013), http://spark.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/microgrid-milestones.
19. Than, supra note 6.
20. Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for
the New Era, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2013, at 40.
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remain only one set of utility transmission and distribution lines, unlike
multiple pole attachments of different phone and cable service lines and
wireless phone technology.21 The final shape of the evolving model is not
possible to discern yet.
Business models must evolve to meet the challenge of climate change22 as
well as these new pressures. The traditional business model for regulated
utilities was to sell kWh. Now a broader range of services must be
provided by utilities when they no longer have a monopoly on power supply.
Under a system of decoupled utility rates, utilities become energyservice providers with energy efficiency being just one facet of their
service, instead of simply being merchants of electrons for power.23 There
is a prediction that the new utility business model will focus on “outputs”
rather than “inputs” in utility regulation. 24 Under some hypothecated
new business models, utilities would become neutral managers of grid
infrastructure, brokers of new customer relationships, partners with
service providers, or financiers of infrastructure.25 Meister Consulting
Group, in a study for the International Energy Agency (“IEA”), forecasts a
new era of “prosumers,”26 who will develop their own PV solar power onsite to cause a decentralized electric supply internationally to “evolutionize
the utility sector just as personal computers and cell phones changed their
respective industries.”27
Consumers typically are charged for electric service as a function of the
quantity of power purchased rather than as fixed costs.28 When fixed
utility grid costs are allocated to a smaller volume of sales, costs for those
21. For more on pole attachment, see STEVEN FERREY, Law of Independent Powers,
THOMSON REUTERS § 10:3 (36th ed. 2015).
22. Lehr, supra note 21, at 35.
23. Katherine Ling, Rising Temps Melt Electric Utilities’ Business Models, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/09/10/10greenwirerising-temps-melt-electric-utilities-business-72148.html.
24. Ronald Lehr, “New Utility Business models,” supra, at 50. (Inputs are easily
quantifiable in the form of costs of utility operation; outputs are more subjective elements).
25. L. Bird et al., Regulatory Considerations Associated With The Expanded
Adoption Of Distributed Solar (Scott Gossett & Mary Lukkonen eds., 2013), http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60613.pdf.; James Newcomb, Virginia Lacy & Lena Hansen, New
Business Models For The Distribution Edge: The Transition From Value Chain To Value
Constellation (2013), http://www.rmi.org/cms/Download.aspx?id=10469&file=201306_eLab
NewBusinessModels.pdf.
26. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS—DRIVERS AND POLICY
OPTIONS (RE-P ROSUMERS) 13 (2014), http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/REPROSUMERS_IEA- RETD_2014.pdf (some studies have also recently suggested that a
more robust definition of electricity prosumers would also incorporate elements such as the
ability to react to dynamic pricing, the use of demand response, and integration with smart grid
infrastructure).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 48.
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customers remaining in service increase retail electricity costs.29 It is not
just utility companies which could lose revenue in this new distributed
generation model. The state government receives a significant benefit from
invisible taxes embedded in typical utility bills and local government
receives property taxes on utility poles and wires, whose value could be
decreased as a lesser amount of power flows through it. Regulated utility
companies pay taxes based on net income and on gross receipts. 30 As
self-generation and competition absorb more power creation and supply,
utility gross receipts decline and state taxes decline correspondingly.
Looking at California’s immediate eastern neighbor state, Arizona
Public Service (“APS”), in late July 2014, filed with the Arizona Corporation
Commission a plan called AZ Sun DG under which APS would lease
conventional consumer rooftops for its own PV generation purposes.31
Under a 20-year conventional lease, APS would pay homeowners $30 per
month (set off as a billing credit) for use of the roof to install and own 20
mW of solar photoelectric systems on 3,000 customer homes.32 APS
would incur itself the capital, installation, and maintenance costs estimated at
$57 million to $70 million for 3,000 homes each with 4 to 8 kW systems,
or $19,000 to $24,350 per home ($3,000 to $5,000/kW installed).33
The key distinction is that these would not be distributed generation:
They would be on the utility side of the meter, which meter would be
below the solar roof unit at grade in the dwelling. Therefore, the power
would be regarded as any other utility-owned generation project, but
29. Jeff McMahon, Steven Chu Solves Utility Companies’ Death Spiral,
FORBES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/je ffmcmahon/2014/03/21/stevenchu-solves-utility-companies-death-spiral/; see also Herman Trabish, California PUC
President: The utility death spiral is ‘last year’s hype,’ GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Utility-Death-Spiral-is-Last-YearsHype-California-PUC- President.
30.
Sheldon Silver, The Electric Industry i n New York (1996) (Citing Section III,
Table 3) (regulated utility companies pay taxes based on net income and on gross receipts.
Taxes imposed on utilities include the 9A Corporate franchise Tax, the Gross Receipts Tax
and the Sales/Use Tax. There also can be local taxes including business income/gross
receipts taxes, sales taxes and property taxes.), http://assembly.state. ny.us/Reports/Energy/
199710/#III.%20FACTORS%20AFFECTING%20ELECTRICITY%20COSTS; see also
Marilyn Marks Rubin, A Guide To New York State Taxes: History, Issues And Concerns
9–4 (2011), http://pjsc.magikcms.com/Tax%20guides/ StateGuideWeb.pdf.
31. Bruce W. Radford, Rent the Rooftop: A New Front Opens in the Solar Wars,
FORTNIGHTLY, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rent-rooftop#sthash.kJNGCRs
O.dpuf.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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situated on land and structures owned by the customer rather than the
utility. However, here, the meter is the message. On which side of the
meter placement one constructs power generation is critical. APS would
own both the PV panels and the power output of them. All power would
later be transacted as retail power at the regulated retail rate.34
This is a means to accelerate use of solar, but not to accelerate
distributed generation. It preserves utility use of the transmission and
distribution network, and customer contributions to the utility for such
power. Ken Johnson, Solar Energy Industries Association, reacted to this:
In a move condemned by many solar companies in Arizona, the state’s largest
utility, APS, has announced that it will begin installing rooftop solar on customers’
homes. After attacking rooftop solar companies in Arizona relentlessly for more
than a year, this latest tactic by APS has a ‘Trojan Horse’ smell to it. Our member
companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this move would stack the
deck in favor of a company which can rate base solar with a guaranteed rate of return.
How is that fair? The Arizona Corporation Commission needs to think this
through very carefully.35

The home customer receives $360 per year, or more than $4,000 over
twenty years, for outlaying no capital, taking no risk, not compromising
its electric service provision, and having a ‘solar home.’ If there is any
central disruption in service during peak daytime hours, depending on
precisely how the solar output is wired, the customer could be insulated
from a central service disruption. It is a formula which is roughly equivalent
to approximately a 50% reduction in the cost of electric service.
With a median size 5 to 6 kW PV array, APS might generate something
in the range of 8,000 kWh of electricity, which would have a retail value
of approximately $4,000 per year and more than twice this retail value
when delivered to a consumer account. The host consumer cuts its
electricity costs roughly in half with no or little risk, the utility generates
power worth more than its out-of-pocket capital and operational cost, and
the utility is able to realize retail transmission and distribution charges
associated with all power. And the state realizes a policy goal of reducing
criteria pollution and carbon emissions while going solar.
The issue here, though, is not so much as to whether it is a viable solar
promotional mechanism, but whether it contradicts on-site distributed
generation, whether that is a valid consideration, and whether a significant
utility presence distorts the solar industry or competition in the state. It is

34. Id. (This differs from the so-called “Buy All, Sell All” business model where
the utility buys the customer-owned output at the lower wholesale rate and sells back the
power to customers at the higher retail rate, thus still collecting and payment for
transmission and distribution).
35. Id.
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argued that the grid operator has clear incentives to favor increasing the
utility’s assets rather than to encourage customer-owned distributed energy
resources. 36 And some argue that “it is imperative that we separate
grid operation from grid ownership and delegate operation to” an
independent distribution system operator.37 There also is a question about
this business model as to whether a utility should place in its rate base and
earn a return on equipment installed in the customers’ residences.
At present, there are few models for a transition to new business models.
C. What Exactly is Electricity?
What has not changed is the electricity itself. Electric circuits are the
physical means for conveying energy in a force field to different places,
but always within the lines or attachments to it .38 Electricity is identical
in every state at every moment: An energy field transmitted as alternating
current at 60 Hertz and cycles per second.39
New intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot supply
reliable base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability
factor in the 10% to 40% range of hours during a week or month.40 Wind
generators have plant effective capacity factors of 20% to 30%. Storage
of electricity is the critical missing link. We do not have any means to
store electricity per se. Instead, as a substitute, we convert electricity either
into chemical energy, in batteries, stored physical energy potential compressed
air, or greater elevated reservoir capacity in hydroelectric pumped storage

36. James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity: Solar for Everyone, Including
Utilities, FORTNIGHTLY, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rooftopparity?page
=0%2C1&authkey=694f9b6d88b73bb34af7a1dfe32592897cf7300b810bfb7d7d2030
eab37ffed0; Farrokh Rahimi & Sasan Mokhtari, From ISO to DSO: Imagining a
New Construct— A n Independent System Operator for the Distribution Network,
F ORTNIGHTLY 42, http://www.fortnightly.com/for tnightly/2014/06/iso-dso.
37. Tong, supra note 36.
38. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 (Addison Wesley
Pub. 1996).
39. World Electricity Standards (citing http://www.worldstandards.eu/electricity/plugsand-sockets/) (the electricity in the world is transmitted via alternating current, where the
current changes direction of flow either 50 or 60 times per second.), http://www.
quantumbalancing.com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm.
40. See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2.12 (36th ed. 2015) (noting
inability of intermittent sources to serve as base-load resource).
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facilities, active physical energy in flywheel revolution, or thermal energy
as heat storage.41
Unlike all other forms of energy, the moving electrons cannot be
efficiently stored as electricity for more than a second before they are lost as
waste heat.42 Therefore, the supply of electricity must match the demand
for electricity over the centralized utility grid on an instantaneous, constant,
real-time, and ongoing basis, or else the electric system shuts down or
expensive equipment is damaged.43 Either too much or too little power
causes system instability on a second-by-second basis.44
As distributed solar has increased, the magnitude and frequency of
voltage fluctuations are more of a problem, increasing maintenance costs
and earlier replacements of certain components. 45 When solar PV output
on distribution lines exceeds the instantaneous load on that line, it can
cause power back-flows between the low-voltage and medium-voltage
lines. This causes reliability problems.46 There can be stability issues when
PV inverters trip off because of grid voltage or frequency fluctuations.47
Grid management is projected to be able to handle up to 30% renewable
penetration.48
Moreover, while generators spin to increase their temperatures to their
design values, the power that these units produce may or may not be used
by the grid, thus incurring power “uplift” costs to the grid.49 First, grid
modifications, upgraded circuits and transformers, and expansion of the
transmission and distribution infrastructure are necessary for renewables, but
not otherwise required anywhere near this degree.50 Second, there is a
need for installation on the system of more quick-start spinning reserve to
respond to the constant intermittency of solar and wind generation and
provide load-following generation.51 This is a very large and often
41. Id. § 2.21.
42. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 568 (6th ed. 2013).
43. MICHAEL BRUCH ET AL. CRO FORUM, POWER BLACKOUT RISKS 6 (Markus
Aichinger ed., 2012), https://www.allianz.com/v_1339677769000/media/responsibility/
documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf; see FERREY, supra note 42.
44. Bruch et al., supra note 43.
45. Rickerson, supra note 2, at 52.
46. Id. at 53–54.
47. Id. at 54.
48. PJM, Executive Summary of Renewable Integration Study for PJM, http://
www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20140303/20140303-pris-pjmcover-letter.ashx.
49. J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in
Integrating Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 34, Aug.–Sept.
2010.
50. Lincoln Davies and Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.
REV. 937, 1002 (2014).
51. Id.
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uncalculated cost, only necessary because of the switch to intermittent
generation supplied by wind and PV units.
All of this changes in the new business model. Rather than utilities,
independent power companies (IPPs) constructed most generations for the
past several years. If these IPPs bear the extra interconnection-related
transmission and distribution system modification and upgrade costs
caused by independent generation, this often significant cost is never
passed on to utility rate-payers. IPPs also may be dispatched in a manner
so that they effectively bear the added system costs for more system
spinning reserves and quick-start power to integrate intermittent power
into a system without compromising reliability.52 If instead, these costs
are socialized to all utility customers as part of the transmission and
distribution system, no customers avoid them—not even in those 15 or so
retail-competition states where customers can purchase power from other
sources than the utility.
Of note, all states still allocate these T & D costs based on volume of
electricity consumption, not by a fixed fee per customer. Therefore,
where general T & D costs are spread to all consumers on a volumetric
basis, distributed generators are able to supply some or all of their own
electricity on-site from their generation unit, and offset some or all of their
T & D charges. Therefore, distributed generators can avoid what would
otherwise be their volumetric share of what revenues eventually become
their own cross-subsidy for their share of system modification and
additional ancillary and spinning reserve requirements—which can
impose these ancillary intermittent distributed generation costs on only
those who still use the grid. State regulators and courts will have to make
this fundamental decision.

52.

Puga, supra note 49, at 34.
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III. THE STATE REGULATORY INCENTIVES THROUGH UTILITIES
The states have undertaken most renewable energy policy initiatives in
the past two decades, sculpting sustainable energy policy around five legal
and policy initiatives:






Net Metering: In 85% of states.
Renewable portfolio standards: In 65% of states.
Renewable System Benefit Charges: In 33% of states.
Carbon and GHG regulation: In 20% of the states.
Feed-In Tariffs: In < 10% of states.

Each of these can be a powerful stimulant to sustainable renewable
energy deployment in a market economy. Each initiative provides a
financial inflow at either the point of project construction or generation of
renewable electric power. The state acts as a regulator, and never owns
the capital equipment for renewable power generation, nor transacts any
sale of the power produced. And it is this action as a regulator, rather than
a market participant, which raises Constitutional issues with discriminatory
state renewable energy initiatives.53 Each of these state measures torques
the operation of the electric energy market through regulation. And for
the conventional utility model of cost recovery based on assets, it can
create legal barriers isolating the cash flow in the model.54
A. FiTs—Energy Regulation
A feed-in tariff (“FiT”) is a regulatory requirement imposed by some
states on their regulated utilities to purchase designated types of
independent power generation on a wholesale basis. Typically, this
includes renewable resources or combined heat and power (“CHP”) units,
at prices well in excess of the market value of wholesale power.55 The
regulated utilities are forced to “buy high” in terms of other electric power
available in the market.56 FiTs allocate revenue in the operating power
53. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW supra note 42, at 162–64; 167 (examining
the market participant exception).
54. “Ring-fencing occurs when a portion of a company’s assets or profits are
financially separated without necessarily being operated as a separate entity. This might
be for regulatory reasons.” WIKIPEDIA, Ringfencing, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Ringfencing&oldid=634792734.
55. STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:134 (36th ed. 201).
56. Electric power in the Northeast has been available at an average price during
the past years of $0.05/Kwh or less. Steven Ferrey, The Fifth Dimension: Legal Infrastructure,
Cracks, and Governance, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 469, 473 n.23 (2014); see generally
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electricity, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2012 (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf (providing the annual statistics for each
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market in favor of the sellers of certain state-designated power, without
adhering to accepted rate-making methodology to minimize prudent
utility-incurred costs.57 Costs of a FiT are passed on to captive consumers
by the utility companies which pay FiTs.58
One commenter has noted that “many advocates of alternative energy
heap acclaim on feed-in tariffs, with one observer declaring them simply
‘fabulous.’”59 “The line of scholars, analysts, and advocates rushing to say
that feed-in tariffs are better [than other mechanisms] is not a short one.”60
However, FiTs have not been seamless, in practice. Problems
highlighted with FiTs include the long-term expense of FiTs, windfall
profits realized by project developers, and inequity between well-off
citizens compared to lower-income citizens.61
Despite a series of lawsuits and accessible articles in the technical and
general press,62 advocates for renewable power are still urging states to
adopt FiTs in the U.S, despite the fact that they are unconstitutional when
adopted at the state regulatory level.63 The federal courts and Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) separately struck down such

state’s average cost to the ultimate consumer for electric power); The Vermont FiTs for
power of this value were set for wind of < 15 kW at $0.20/kWh, for wind > 15 kW at
$0.125/kWh, and for solar generation at $0.30/kWh. Ferrey, supra note 55.
57. FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 55, § 10:113.
58. Id. §10:134.
59. Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.
REV. 937, 938–39 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 940.
62. See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L. Q. 835 (2008); Steven Ferrey, Chad
Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control
Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125 (2010);
Brian H. Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Leakage: How California can Evade the
Impending Constitutional Attacks, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 43, 43–44 (2006) (“. . . because of
these two Constitutional issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their
proposals”); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, FIT in the USA: Constitutional
Questions About State-Mandated Renewable Tariffs, FORTNIGHTLY MAG. (June 2010),
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2010/06/fit-usa?page=0%2C0; Steven Ferrey, Shaping
American Power: Federal Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47
(1991–1992); Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional
Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89, 110–13 (2012).
63. Paul Gipe, Time to Break Free of Net Metering; We Need a ‘FiT’ Policy for
Renewable Energy to Soar, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC BLOG (Dec. 26, 2013), http://energyblog.
nationalgeographic.com/2013/12/26/breakfree-net-metering/.
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FiTs in California in the 1990s.64 And having not succeeded before both
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and FERC in the mid-1990s,65 California
implemented more FiTs fifteen years later. After enacting a feed-in-tariff
requiring California state utilities to make wholesale power purchases at
well in excess of wholesale rates and in excess of avoided costs, this was
a challenge at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as to whether
this violated the Federal Power Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
California argued that its environmental purpose for regulation should
make it exempt from preemption in setting above-market wholesale feedin renewable tariff rates for cogeneration facilities of less than 20 Mw and
that environmental costs could be considered to inflate avoided costs.66
The affected utilities and others countered that federal law does not allow
state regulation of wholesale sales to achieve state environmental goals,
and that federal preemption cannot be avoided based on an environmental
purpose of the preempted state regulation. The utilities also noted that
states may not under the guise of environmental regulation adopt an
economic regulation that requires electricity purchases at a wholesale
price outside the framework of the Federal Power Act, or if acting under
PURPA, at a price that exceeds avoided cost.67
FERC again struck California’s feed-in tariffs, and held that wholesale
generators can receive no more than system-wide avoided cost for power
sales: “even if a QF has been exempted pursuant to the Commission’s
regulations from the ratemaking provisions of the Federal Power Act, a
state still cannot impose a ratemaking regime inconsistent with the
requirements of PURPA and this Commission’s regulations—i.e., a state
cannot impose rates in excess of avoided cost.”68 FERC rejected all of
California’s arguments regarding generic environmental rationales for
wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or as set by FERC.69
FERC held that its authority under the Federal Power Act includes the
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of sales
for resale of electric energy in interstate commerce.70

64. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853
(9th Cir. 1994); S. California Edison Co., 159 P.U.R.4th 381, ¶ 61675 (FERC Feb. 22,
1995).
65. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 850; 159 P.U.R.4th at ¶ 61675.
66. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n S. California Edison Co. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 132 FERC ¶¶ 61,047, 61,338–39 (July 15, 2010).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 16 U.S.C §§ 824(d)–(e) (2006); e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
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California argued that its environmentally beneficial purposes should
make it exempt from preemption in setting non-market-conforming
wholesale rates for a state FiT.71 FERC found state purpose to not permit
illegal establishment of FiTs requiring purchases of electricity at inflated
wholesale prices72 and renewable wholesale generators could receive no
more than fair wholesale market prices under federal law.73 FERC reiterated
that only the federal government can regulate commerce between the
states and California cannot attempt to regulate commerce outside its
borders.74
B. Net Metering
Under net metering, allowed in 43 states including California, for a
customer who purchases and uses electricity from the distribution company,
the meter runs forward; when more electricity is produced from the facility
than is consumed by the customer, the excess is sent to the electricity grid,
running the meter in reverse direction and reversing the net accounting of
power flow.75 By turning the meter backwards, and because only a single
rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively compensates the
generator at the full retail rate (which includes approximately two-thirds
of the retail bill attributable to transmission, distribution, and taxes) for
transferring just the wholesale energy commodity—the power itself.76
In essence, it receives for that power an amount that could be above the
utility’s avoided cost, and does not compensate for distribution investments
made by the utility. Net metering is not designed to afford a fair price

71. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010), Order on Petitions for
Declaratory Order.
72. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. (FERC rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic
environmental rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or set by
FERC).
73. 33 FERC ¶ 61,059, at 71 (FERC Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing
Rehearing).
74. Id.
75. See Glossary, Database St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.
dsireusa.org/glossary. (“When a customer’s generation exceeds the customer’s use,
electricity from the customer flows back to the grid, offsetting electricity consumed by the
customer at a different time during the same billing cycle.”).
76. Id. (“In effect, the customer uses excess generation to offset electricity that the
customer otherwise would have to purchase at the utility’s full retail rate.”). As to whether
electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it should be treated under the law, see STEVE
FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION 211–31 (2000).
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based on ratemaking law; but is a random price generally equal to the
retail price, which has no direct correspondence to the value of wholesale
power traded in the market. It adopts a retail price already determined in
other tariffs, but bearing no relationship to wholesale markets. It is wholly
divorced from rate making principles, ignoring that the net metering customer
uses the distribution grid twice (going and coming) and assessed as not using
the grid at all.
Net metering is more an accounting convention applied to trading
power than it is a legal commodity sale according to case decisions, and
it typically is applicable by state law and order to renewable sources of
distributed power on the customer’s side of the retail utility meter.77
Electricity has a unique physical characteristic: It cannot be stored efficiently
as electricity; storage of electricity occurs indirectly in a different form as
physical or chemical energy, rather than as electricity.78 Therefore, the supply
of electricity must match the demand for electricity over the centralized
utility grid of a nation on an instantaneous basis, or else the electric system
shuts down or expensive equipment is damaged.79
Convenience of a numeric value does not justify its use for different
purposes. National Grid estimated that net metering costs will more than
double between summer 2013 and the end of 2013 ($0.09/month to $0.23/
Month), and then more than triple again by the end of 2014($0.93/
month).80 Utilities in California estimate that net metering may mean as
much as $1.4 billion a year in lost revenue that will have to be added to
the bills of non-net-metering customers.81 State utilities want stricter
limits on the size of net metering units: San Diego Gas & Electric Company
alleged that net metering provided an “unfair and unsustainable subsidy”
of approximately $34 from each other customer to net metering customers.82
The California Public Utility Commission reported that by 2020, net

77. Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy Clause,
24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012); see also GLOSSARY, DATABASE ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/glossary/ (providing a
definition of “net metering”).
78. See Ferrey, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 568 (describing inability
to store electricity).
79. STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY CHOICES
FOR CARBON RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 149 (2010) (describing how electric system
operates).
80. Bruce Mohl, The Back Story: Green Energy Concerns, COMMONWEALTH MAG., Aug.
8, 2013.
81. Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013,
at B1.
82. Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E’s Planned Surcharge,
Saying It May Be Illegal, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 21, 2011, at 18.

16

FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 6: 1, 2014–15]

10/3/2016 9:31 AM

California Challenges & Vulnerabilities
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

metering could cost non-solar electricity customers $370-$1.1 billion per
year.83
Idaho moved in 2013 to adjust the amount net-metering facilities in the
state are paid, in order to lessen electric company/ratepayer impacts. This
increases customer demand charges in the distribution rates and
commensurately decrease retail energy rates. The intent is to even out rates
paid by participating and non-participating net-metering customers, and
alleviate the burden on utilities and their customers.84
Virginia introduced legislation to allow Dominion Virginia Power to
collect a standby charge from customers with net-metered systems larger
than 10 kW.85 There have been proposals on net-metered tariff changes
in Arizona and Georgia.86 Arizona in late 2013 imposed an additional fee
of approximately $4.90/month on solar installations.87
C. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the Commerce Clause
Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted state
renewable portfolio standards (RPS).88 A resource portfolio requirement
requires certain electricity sellers and buyers to maintain evidence of a
predetermined percentage of designated clean resources in their wholesale
electric supply mixes.89 Several states also award rebates to customers

83. Than, supra note 6, at 3.
84. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n, Case No. IPC-E-12-27, Order No. 32767 (Mar. 25,
2013).
85. Virginia Incentives/Policies for Renewables and Efficiencies, Database of St.
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?
Incentive_Code=VA02R (last updated July 2, 2014).
86. See Standby & Fixed Cost Charges And Net Energy Metering Debates: Current
Status, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH.CNTR., http://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/StateStatus-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf.
87. Id. (New net-metered rooftop solar system are charged about $4.90 per month
as of January 2014)
88.
See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf
(last visited Mar. 2013).
89. The resources such as renewables, DSM, or high efficiency fossil combustion,
as defined by a particular state, would be included in the company’s overall resource
portfolio. Portfolio requirements can be applied to electricity sellers, such as generation
companies and vertically integrated utilities as a condition of continued market access.
The requirements could also be applied to wholesale electricity buyers, such as distribution
companies and electricity brokers but the states do not exercise authority over wholesale
markets.
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who install solar systems.90 Generators of PV power can make direct
bilateral sales of their S-RECs to retail suppliers of power, which will have
to purchase enough S-RECs each year to equal the required percentage of
power generation set by the state.
RPS programs have been characterized as a form of ‘backdoor’
renewable subsidies.91 It is estimated that 45% of the 4,300 MW of wind
power installed in the U.S. between 2001 to 2004 was motivated by state
renewable portfolio standards, while an additional 15% of these installations
were motivated by state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.92 The
current RPS standards are projected to add 76,750 MW of additional
renewable generation by 2025.93
The cost of acquiring the required RECs is passed on to captive retail
power consumers.94 The California Public Utility Commission (“PUC”)
Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized the rapid escalation in
California ratepayer costs to achieve the RPS mandate.95 The cost of RPS
compliance exceeded the cost of the power itself.96
As a quick calculation, the typical national cost to the utility to purchase
RECs is approximately a 40% increase in cost of the value of the
wholesale power itself (not the total cost of retail bundled cost including
taxes).97 For a utility in Massachusetts, the REC purchase price is
currently about equal to the wholesale cost of the power itself.98 With
solar RECs, in some states it is averaging 400-500% over the value of the
power in terms of the cost to utilities for solar RECs.99 The ACP penalty
price to the utility of not complying can be + 1000% the value of the power
involved.100
90. K.S. Corey & B.J. Sweazey, Renewable Portfolio Standards In The States:
Balancing Goals And Implementation Standards 11–12 (National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, NREL/TP 670–41409, 2007).
91. Robert Glennon & Andrew M. Reeves, Solar Energy’s Cloudy Future, 1 ARIZ.
J. ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y 91, 106 (2010).
92. Ryan Wiser & Mark Bollinger, Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment of
Renewable Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans, ELECTRICITY J., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 48.
93. Brad Plummer, The Biggest Fight Over Renewable Energy is Now in the States,
WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2013.
94. See Glennon & Reeves, supra note 92, at 108.
95. Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California’s Three Big Utilities Soared
Last Year, CPUC Data Shows, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Author’s calculation assuming a trading price of $15–20 for a state REC.
98. Author’s calculation, assuming $60/REC selling price, with wholesale power
being transacted in ISO-NE at approximately an average price of $50/Mwh.
99. Author’s calculations with Massachusetts solar RECs selling in the $220–
500/SREC trading range.
100. Author’s calculation, comparing an ACP of $550/SREC in Massachusetts with
the $50/Mwh average price of power.
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A number of states have enacted RPS law which treats renewable
energy created in the state or immediate geographic region preferentially
to renewable energy generated in other states. This raises significant
constitutional issues. Some prohibit the REC credit for out-of-state or outof-region generation facilities.101 These geographic program restrictions raise
dormant commerce clause concerns under the U.S. Constitution. A number
of the twenty-nine states with RPS that have incorporated credit multipliers,
geographic restrictions, or preferences to promote in-state/in-region generation
of power, to the exclusion of external power, in the following percentages:






Eight of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 27%, have REC
multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,102 Colorado,103
Delaware,104 Maine,105 Michigan,106 Missouri,107 Nevada,108
and Washington.109
Four of the RPS states, or 14%, including two states that also
provide for a geographically discriminatory REC multiplier,
have or earlier had either a requirement or preference for instate generation: California,110 Colorado,111 North Carolina,112
and Ohio.113
Four of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 14%, give program
preferences to the use of in-state manufactured products or

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Corey & Sweazey, supra note 90, at 8.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2009).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(V)(A)–(D), (1)(c)(IX), (1)(d) (2013).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(a)(1), (d)–(e) (2012).
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2010).
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1039(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (West 2013).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7822 (LexisNexis 2011).
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110(1)(c)(i)–(ii) (2008).
California Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (June 25, 2014), http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA25R&re=1&ee=1 (explaining that a maximum
of 25% of RPS compliance can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy
credits; therefore, the remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through in-state
power sales).
111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (1)(e)(II)–(III) (2013).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (West 2012).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012).
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in-state labor forces: Arizona,114 Delaware,115 Michigan,116
and Montana.117
Eleven of the twenty-nine RPS states, representing 38% of
RPS states, have a requirement for in-region, rather than instate, geographic location of generation to create RECs,
including one of the states that also has in-state multipliers
and one with an in-state preference: Connecticut,118 Illinois,119
Maine,120 Maryland,121 Massachusetts,122 New Hampshire,123
North Carolina, Ohio, 124 Oregon,125 Pennsylvania, 126 and
Rhode Island.127
Eleven of the twenty-nine states, or 38%, have an in-state
requirement for certain distributed power.128
Four of the twenty-nine states, or 14%, have a benefit for an
in-state capital component or labor.129
Some states have multiple multipliers and preferences.130
Only seven of the twenty-nine states, or 24%, have no
geographic preferences in their laws.131

California requires a certain amount of RECs to effectively be bundled
with electricity generated from renewable resources in or connected to
state transmission, which has a discriminatory effect on out-of-state

114. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2007).
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 351(b)–(c) (2009).
116. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1001(2)(a)–(d) (LexisNexis 2010).
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a(b) (West 2013).
119. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-56(b) (West 2013).
120. 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis 2011).
121. MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03.03(D) (2011).
122. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
123. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(I) (LexisNexis 2011).
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(5) (LexisNexis 2012).
125. OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.135(1)(a), (2) (2011).
126. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West 2008).
127. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2012).
128. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce
Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY
L. 59, 75–77 (2012) (noting that resource eligibility in state RPS programs has expanded
beyond traditional renewables) [hereinafter Threading the Constitutional Needle].
129. Steven Ferrey, Alternative Energy in a Spaghetti Western: Clint Eastwood
Confronts State Renewable Energy Policy, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2012) (listing
Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, and Montana as having this in-state benefit) [hereinafter
Alternative Energy].
130. Id. at 291–92.
131. Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 128, at 79.
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facilities.132 California made a decision in 2010 that renewable energy credits,
to satisfy the California renewable portfolio standard, can be tradable
credits from the Western Renewable Energy Generation Information System.
A decision in California of the Public Utilities Commission was to limit
investor-owned utilities’ use of tradable RECs to five percent of total
annual renewable procurement targets between 2009 to 2011. In 2010, the
limit was changed by regulators to allow 25% of the California RPS to be
satisfied by tradable RECs that are not bundled with the electric power.133
While this would seem like a more open-minded removal of state
barriers, it operates in the opposite fashion. Before, it could have been
argued that the regulatory distinction was not based on geographic
limitations, but on a non-separate tradable status, as long as California
does not create tradable RECs, the newer 2010 system has the effect of
limiting out-of-state renewable generation RECs to a minority share of the
compliance credits. Four states—Alabama, Texas, Nebraska and North
Dakota—indicated that they were planning to bring suit against California
claiming their RPS program interfered with interstate commerce.134
Most recently, Justice Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator’s
(MISO)135 proportionate customer utility allocation of interstate transmission
costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power
to populated areas.136 The Court used a 2012 law review article, authored

132. The California Public Utilities Commission staff recognizes that this could
invoke constitutional problems. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DIV. OF STRATEGIC PLANNING,
RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES AND THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD
PROGRAM 90–91 (2006).
133. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DOCKET NO. 10-03-021 2, 4, 80 (2010).
134. Michael N. Mills, Will California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard Survive
a Commerce Clause Challenge by Other States? A Recently Filed Colorado Case May
Provide the Answer, THE O VERRIDE , May 2011, at 6, http://www.stoel.com/Files/The
Override_CaseoftheMonth_may2011.pdf.
135. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. See
Jennifer Simon-Lento, 7th Circuit upholds FERC approval of novel cost allocation,
questions constitutionality of RPSs favoring in-state generation, and paves the way for
renewable-friendly grid expansion projects, NIXON PEABODY LLP, 1 (June 19, 2013),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/157407_Energy_Alert_6_19_13.pdf.
136. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, et al. v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 772–73, 781 (7th Cir. 2013)
(MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the utilities who draw
power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage).
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by Professor Ferrey, as authority for its holding to support respective
jurisdiction of state and federal government electricity regulation.137 In
dicta, the decision declared it unconstitutional for a state to limit another
state’s renewable portfolio standards to in-state generation because it is a
violation of the Commerce Clause: “It trips over an insurmountable
constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce
clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state
renewable energy.”138 Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion
in West Lynn Creamery, submitted that, “subsidies for in-state industry. . .
would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding
principle” for “dormant” Commerce Clause cases.139
The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized the
rapid escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the RPS mandate.140
The cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the power itself.141 The
California Division of Ratepayer Advocates reported that the California
Public Utilities Commission has approved nearly every renewable contract
filed by the utilities, even when they rate poorly on least-cost, best-fit criteria:
The [California] PUC . . . has greenlighted all but two of 184 green-energy proposals
since 2002 . . . .The state Division of Ratepayer Advocates, whose purpose is to
represent consumers, concluded in a report last year [2011] that the power
contracts the PUC has been approving have put consumers on the hook for $6 billion
in excess costs. ‘What the commission’s practice has been is not to consider the
cost of renewable power but to approve every renewable project that came before
them,’ said Joe Como, acting director of the division. ‘We really spent too much
money. It’s frustrating as hell.’142

National Grid estimated the cost of $3.95/month per residential customer
to pay for the Massachusetts RPS program, expected to rise by $1/month
by 2015.143 In 2014, Ohio became the first state to freeze its RPS program,
negating the annual legislated increase in RPS requirements for two
years.144 The RPS requirement remained but did not advance as originally
137. Id. at 776.
138. Id.
139. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California’s Three Big Utilities Soared
Last Year, CPUC Data Shows, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18.
141. Id.
142. Evan Halper et al., Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar Plants,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/20/local/la-me-bigsolar20120921.
143. Bruce Mohl, The Back Story: Green Energy Raising Concerns: Mandates
Account for 5.4% of Monthly Bill, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.
commonwealthmagazine.org/Voices/Back-Story/2013/Summer/004-Green-energy-costsraising-concerns.aspx.
144. Tom Knox, The Freeze is on—Kasich Signs S.B. 310, Halts Renewable and
Energy-Efficiency Standards, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (June 13, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.
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legislated. This did not repeal the Ohio RPS program, but retarded its
inclining curve of greater renewable energy credit purchase by utilities for
two years.
D. State System Benefit Charges
A system benefits charge (“SBC”) is a per-kWh power surcharge imposed
on all retail electricity consumers within a state utility’s service territory
through monthly utility bills, which creates an additional state-controlled
or state-administered energy fund.145 These state renewable trust funds
distribute money to subsidize various renewable energy resource projects
and technologies pursuant to state legislation.146 Approximately one-third
of U.S. states have enacted SBC and “public benefit funds”147–seventeen
states plus the District of Columbia.148
Between 1998 to 2012, 14 states collected approximately $3.5 billion
with existing renewable system benefit charges to endow energy trust
funds.149 More than half the amount collected, at least $135 million/year,
came from just California. California obtains approximately 30 percent of
its power from outside the state. 150 A number of these states, either
com/columbus/news/2014/06/13/the-freeze-is-on-kasich-signs-s-b-310-halts.html. In June 2014,
Ohio enacted Senate Bill 310 to freeze for two years renewable energy and energy efficiency
cross-subsidies, making Ohio the first state to back off its RPS. Id. As a result, Ohio’s
renewable energy mandate will remain at 2.5 percent and its energy efficiency standard at
4.2 percent compared to 2009 levels for the next two years. Id. A legislative committee
will review the standards enacted in 2008, which provide that 25 percent of the electricity
sold by Ohio utilities must be generated from alternative energy sources. Id. Half of that
must come from renewables like wind power, solar must account for at least 0.5 percent
of the renewables load, and utilities must slash customers’ power usage by 22 percent in
the same time frame. Id.
145. N.C. Solar Center., Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency:
Public Benefits Funds for Renewables, www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/PBF
_Map.pdf.
146. Id.
147. ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, STATE OF THE
STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65 (2009),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf.
148. Id.
149. M. BOLINGER & R. WISER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE IMPACT OF
STATE CLEAN ENERGY FUND SUPPORT FOR UTILITY-SCALE RENEWABLE PROJECTS, (Clean
EnergyStates Alliance2006), http:// eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/lbnl-56422.pdf.
150. World Nuclear Assoc., California Electricity, updated August 2014 (“California
Energy Commission (CEC) data for 2008 shows in-state generation of 208.5 billion kWh
and net imports of 98 billion kWh to give total of 306.5 TWh, 14.44% of this nuclear,
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explicitly or as a matter of practice, will only fund sustainable energy
projects within their own states, even though power from all sources
inside and outside the states are taxed to create the SBC fund. The Illinois
legislature decided its program would “develop[] new renewable energy
resources and clean coal technologies for use in Illinois [for distributing
these funds]” and “[t]he criteria should promote the goal of fostering
investment in and the development and use, in Illinois, of renewable
energy resources.”151 However, the effectuation of the desire to retain
subsidy funds for in-state benefit raises the dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional issue of discriminating against commerce in out-of-state
electricity.152
E. State Climate Control
In the absence of federal climate change legislation in the United States,
originally ten, and now nine, eastern states have combined into the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) to regulate carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) emitted from their larger power plants.153 Additionally, California
has comprehensive regulation of all greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) from all
sources,154 and other western155 and midwestern156 states initiated—but
since postponed or abandoned—global warming gas regulation.

18.21% coal, 45.74% natural gas, 11.0% large hydro and 10.61% other renewables.),
available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/California-s-Electricity/.
151. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 687/6–3(b) (2008) (emphasis added); see also id. at § 687/6–
4(b).
152. See, e.g., Ferrey, Follow the Money!, supra note 62; see also Ferrey, Constitutional
Barriers, supra note 62; Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable
Standards at the State Level, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 52 (March 2006).
153. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., http://www.rggi.org/rggi (listing
participating states); New Jersey recently withdrew, and other states have considered withdrawal
from this cap-and-trade program. Angela Delli Santi & Beth DeFalco, New Jersey Withdrawing
from Regional Greenhouse Gas Program, CBS CONN., May 26, 2011, http://connecticut.
cbslocal.com/2011/05/26/42273.
154. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–38599 (Deering 2010). The California
carbon scheme requires that California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020,
considering all in-state and out-of-state generation used to serve California electric load.
Id. § 38550.
155. History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/
history; FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 40, § 6:9. Six of the seven states
withdrew in 2011, “leaving California alone in this now-unitary consortium, along with the
four observing Canadian provinces.” Id.
156. Nora Macaluso, Midwest States to Commence Work on Details of Regional
Climate Strategy, BNA ENVTL. REP., Nov. 30, 2007, at 2. The three states of Indiana, Ohio, and
South Dakota opted out of this scheme and were observers; Dean Scott, Midwestern States
to Draw Up Model Rule By End of 2008 to Implement Cap-and-Trade, BNA ENVTL. REP.,
Feb. 22, 2008, at 1.
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RGGI157 and California’s A.B. 32 carbon regulation program158 both
adopted ‘cap-and-trade’ programs. RGGI regulates only CO2 emissions
from power plants larger than 25 mW.159 California’s A.B. 32 regulates
all carbon emissions from all major industries in the state.160 RGGI is
more limited than California in covered entities and industries, the kinds
of GHGs emissions controlled, and the amount of emissions targeted and
controlled.161
Laws that attempt to arrest leakage around the edges of state-limited
programs, by regulating the conduct of out-of-state businesses, violate the
Commerce Clause.162 These laws can assume the form of added taxes and
charges on out-of-state goods.163 States are prohibited from attaching
restrictions to any goods that they import from other states.164 States
cannot regulate in ways where the practical effect is to control conduct in
other states.165
Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two types of
wine—both produced from products produced in the state—even though
not required to mention the state by name, the effect was practically statespecific discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory, and a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.166 A state cannot regulate to
favor, or require the use of, its own in-state energy resources even for a

157. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/
agreement.htm.
158. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38501 (Deering 2007).
159. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Goals, Proposed Tasks, Short-Term Action
Items (2003), http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfinal.pdf.
160. See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.
161. See Appendix J Allowance Allocation, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/
2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative Model Rule, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20
Revised%2012.31.08.pdf.
162. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (1989) [hereinafter Healy]
(striking requirement that the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state).
163. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) (invalidating
an Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).
164. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994)
[hereinafter Carbone] (“States and localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in
order to control commerce in other States”).
165. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
166. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); see also Carbone, 511 U.S.
at 393.

25

FERREY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

10/3/2016 9:31 AM

small percentage of total use,167 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energyrelated resources originating in the state.168 A state cannot require usage
of in-state fuels even for the rationale to satisfy federal Clean Air Act
requirements.169 Income tax credits cannot be given by a state only to instate producers of fuel additives.170
The Supreme Court consistently has required that the regulation of
power by the states must not discriminate based on the origin of power or
the ultimate impact which may discourage its flow in interstate commerce.171
Recent federal court opinions construing state electric regulation have
scrupulously followed this doctrine.172
F. Legal Conclusion
States, including California, employ five techniques, any of which can
or cannot create a barrier to traditional utility cash flow. The predominate
focal point has been net energy metering, employed in 86% of the states,
and renewable portfolio standards, employed in 60% of the states.173 Both
of these state enactments cause the typical customer unknowingly to
cross-subsidize certain other customers who are diverging from the
traditional utility model of centralized electric power supply. Utilities
are ordered by state regulators to be the agents of this change, and in most
states the costs of these significant cross-subsidies are not revealed on the
customers’ bills, as is the breakdown of the other detailed components of
electricity cost (the power commodity, transmission, distribution, stranded
costs, etc.).174 FiTs are unconstitutional when adopted by U.S. states for

167. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992). The Oklahoma statute
overturned involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers. As a result
of the statute, the market changed in response from use of almost all out-of-state coal to
“the utilities purchased [in-state] Oklahoma coal in amounts ranging from 3.4% to 7.4%
of their annual needs, with a necessarily corresponding reduction in purchases of Wyoming
coal.”; see also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
168. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) [hereinafter
New England Power Co.].
169. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1995).
170. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988).
171. New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 331 (overturning as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public Utilities Commission that restrained
within the state for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, renewable power
produced within the state).
172. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC et. al. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393,
431 (2nd Cir. 2013).
173. See FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 55; see supra note 56.
174. See, e.g., NSTAR monthly bill (on file with author).
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their regulated investor-owned utilities,175 and net metering176 and RPS177
have attracted recent constitutional scrutiny.
Conflict is thus inevitable. There has been litigation regarding the five
regulatory techniques around the traditional model:









One of these five state initiatives, FiTs, has been stricken
as illegal/unconstitutional.178
A second of these five initiatives, renewable portfolio
standards, is unconstitutional in the method that some
states have implemented it and in mid-2013 was declared
by the federal Court of Appeals to be unconstitutional.179
A third of these five initiatives, system benefit charges, as
implemented in some states, is at least de jure constitutionally
questionable on its face.180
A recent federal adjudicatory order casts uncertainty on a
fourth of these five initiatives, net metering.181
The fifth of these five state initiatives, carbon regulation,
has at least one state withdrawing participation due to a
perceived lack of benefit given the cost to power consumers,182
and California’s program has lost some law suits against
it which have proceeded to a decision on the merits.183
A 2014 decision of the federal court in Minnesota holding
clearly unconstitutional a Minnesota statute which banned
the import of foreign coal or new facility coal-produced
power into Minnesota for power generation or the construction
of new plants which would burn coal from out of state,
prohibited any new power purchase agreements for power
produced by out-of-state coal-burning plants and raised the

175. See Gipe, supra note 63.
176. In re Riggs, 138 FERC 61,172 (2012); Esther Whieldon, FERC Declines
Enforcement Action on Rhode Island Ratepayers PURPA Complaint, INSIDE FERC, Mar.
19, 2012, at 4.
177. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n, et al. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., 721 F.3d
764 (2013).
178. Cal. Public Utils. Comm’n et al., 132 FERC ¶¶ 61,047, 61,339 (2010) (Order
on Petitions for Declaratory Order).
179. See supra note 176.
180. See supra note 153.
181. Sun Edison, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, para. 18 (Nov. 19, 2009) (declaratory order).
182. See infra at Section E.
183. See infra note 213.
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cost of future purchases of coal power by assigning
environmental costs to use of the fuel.184
There was a successful suit by Transcanada alleging that
Massachusetts renewable energy tradable credits under
capped incentives violated the Dormant Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution 185 by limiting eligible solar
Renewable Energy Credits as well as issuing long-term
power purchase contracts only to Massachusetts companies.186
After stating that it had confidence in its position,
Massachusetts immediately settled the litigation so as to
avoid a court decision, providing that TransCanada would
be eligible for these programs.187
A challenge to the California LCFS rule as violating the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution188 was
successful in federal district court for the Eastern District
of California, finding that it “discriminates against out-ofstate corn-derived ethanol while favoring in-state corn
ethanol and impermissibly regulates extraterritorial
conduct.”189 The Court held that the LCFS rule differentiates
based on place of origin of the commerce and concluded
that the LCFS discriminates on its face against out-of-state
corn-derived ethanol 190 may not impose a barrier to
interstate commerce based on the distance that the product
must travel in interstate commerce.”191 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court finding of unconstitutionality in a

184. North Dakota v. Heydinger, D. Minn., No., 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. Apr.
18, 2014); Minn. Stat. § 216B.1694, subd. 1 (2008); In the Matter of the Application of
Otter Tail Power Company and Others for the Certification of Transmission Facilities in
W. Minn., 2009 Minn. PUC LEXIS 6 (Mar. 17, 2009); In the Matter of Great River Energy’s
2008 Resource Plan; In in the Matter of Great River Energy’s Proposed Carbon Offset,
2010 Minn. PUC LEXIS 458 (Dec. 3, 2010).
185. Complaint, Transcanada Power Mktg., Ltd. v. Bowles, et al., No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D.
Mass. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.ohiogreenstrategies.com/documents/
transcanada.pdf; E. Ailworth, State looking to settle suit over law on clean energy, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/
lawsuit_hits_mass_law_promoting_local_energy_providers/.
186. Id.
187. See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. v.
Bowles et al., No. 10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Jun. 6, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/
doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf.
188. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
189. Id. at 1081.
190. Id. at 1087.
191. Id. at 1089.
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split decision with a dissent. A petition for a rehearing en
banc was denied, with members of the Ninth Circuit dissenting
from that denial noting that “California—could under the
majority’s reasoning—penalize out-of-state wineries to
account for the environmental effects of transporting their
wines to California.”192
There has been recent litigation in major states, including New Jersey,
Maryland, and Vermont in federal courts, affirmed in all cases by the
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals, which found
preempted state electric power regulation193:



A successful constitutional challenge by conventional
power generators to New Jersey’s in-state energy facility
preferences;194
A successful constitutional challenge by conventional power
generators to Maryland’s in-state energy facility preferences;195

192. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 518 (9th Cir. 2014).
A petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, with members of the Ninth Circuit dissenting
from that denial noting that “California—could under the majority’s reasoning—penalize
out-of-state wineries to account for the environmental effects of transporting their wines
to California.”
193. For an article concluding that the Maryland RPS program and others that similarly
facially discriminate against interstate commerce are likely unconstitutional in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause, see Anne Hayemann, Note, Surviving the Commerce
Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution,
71 MD. L. REV. 848, 851 (2012); Entergy Nuclear Vermont, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d
393, 393 (2d Cir. 2013); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st
Cir. 1989).
194. See PPL Energyplus v. Hanna, 997 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013), aff’d, PPL
Energyplus v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2014) (field preemption on wholesale
power prices and rates and finding the New Jersey regulation a violation of the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause); PJM Interconnection, 135 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2011). In
2011, New Jersey enacted legislation to encourage the acquisition by utilities of the output
of 2000 Mw of new in-state power projects. Mary Powers, PJM Generators File
Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ In-state Generation Law, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WK., Feb. 7, 2011, at 11; Hannah Northey, Utilities Challenge N.J. Law While Preparing to
Reap Its Benefits, ENVTL. & ENERGY PUBLICATION, LLC (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.eenews.
net/stories/1059945886; Powers, supra note 197, at 11, 13.
195. See PPL Energyplus v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013),
aff’d, 753 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale
power prices and finding the Maryland regulation a violation of the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause).
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Vermont’s attempt to discriminate against and control the
sale of interstate power generated in its state.196

In 2013, the Supreme Court,197 the federal circuit courts of appeals,198
federal trial courts,199 plus FERC,200 confronted seven specific federal
cases alleging states in regulating energy violated the Supremacy Clause
and/or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. At either the trial or
appellate court levels, the states have lost each of these on a significant
legal claim of petitioners. Of note, state losses on constitutional grounds
can result in challengers’ attorneys’ fees being shifted to state taxpayers.201
Where states have prevailed, it is often by raising procedural defenses of
standing, ripeness, redressability, concreteness, mootness, or justiciability, to
avoid having to defend their statutes on the merits and substantive law.
All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection, which
include electric energy in interstate commerce:202
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or
manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this respect.203

196. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d. 183, 236 (D. Vt.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2013). The trial court found the
regulation unconstitutional and issued an injunction “enjoin[ing] Defendants from conditioning
Vermont Yankee’s continued operation on the existence of a below-market PPA with
Vermont utilities.” Id. at 239.
197. American Trucking Ass’ns v. Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 927 (2013); City of Arlington,
Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (May 20,
2013).
198. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2013); Ill.
Commerce Comm’n v. Federal Regulatory Commission, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013;
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
199. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233 (D. Vt.
2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d. 1071, 1099 (E.D
Cal. 2011); PPl Energyplus v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 3d. 790 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013),
aff’d, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale
power prices); PPL Energyplus v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013), aff’d, PPL
Energyplus, LLC, et al, v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2014) (field preemption on
wholesale power prices and rates).
200. Supra note 178, at 61,337–38.
201. In the New Jersey case, the plaintiffs were allowed to submit an application for
the state to cover their legal fees. PPL Energy Plus v. Solomon 2011 WL 5007972 (D.
N.J. 2011). Scheduling Order, entered Oct. 18, 2013. Similarly in the Maryland case and
the Entergy case, application for attorneys fees were granted; PPL Energy Plus v. Hanna,
977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp.
2d. 183, 233 (D. Vt. 2013).
202. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (“[T]ransmissions on the
interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce.”).
203. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress meant to draw a “bright
line,” easily ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, between
state and federal jurisdiction.204 California, in 2011, lost its case attempting
to defend its state FiTs for renewable power.205 Much power generation,
and particularly new wind and solar facilities, are not owned by the retail
utilities that deliver power to retail customers, but instead are owned by
independent wholesale market participants in California and on the east
coast.206 The amount of power wholesaled before it is sold at retail has
shifted from only 8% in the 1960s to a majority today.207 As noted by the
federal courts and affirmed by the Supreme Court, these independent
market participants are the new competitive reality in power and energy
markets:208
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial result of these energy
market regulatory reforms has been ‘a massive shift in regulatory jurisdiction
from the states to FERC.’ . . . The upshot of these federal and state innovations
in electricity regulation is that state regulators, despite their continued authority
over rates charged directly to consumers, have much less actual authority over
those rates than they did [earlier].209

Electricity moving constantly in interstate commerce virtually at the
speed of light,210 raises issues that the states have not best handled:

204. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
205. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010).
206. See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLES 217, 217–18 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) [hereinafter Sale of Electricity].
This spun generation assets, including nuclear generation, out into independent ownership not
subject to state regulation. See id; The costs of these independent wholesale power entities
are not recovered through state-regulated retail rates, but rather through wholesale rates
subject to FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. See id; Relevant to the area in which this facility
operates, see ISO-NE 2013 GIS Load Asset Listing, (Jan. 11, 2015, 2:43 PM), http://
www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/settlements/gis.
207. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES 10–11 (2000) [hereinafter THE NEW RULES];
FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 587.
208. See FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 207, at 269–70.
209. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053,
1066–67 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom, vacated 547 F.3d 1081
(2008); see Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 554 U.S.
527 (2008); see also Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d
Cir 2013).
210.
See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2:1 (36th ed. 2015); Steven
Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamic, Mass, and
Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1914 (2004).
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California in 2011 lost a suit on its carbon control cap-andtrade regulation, resulting in an additional year of delay in
the program until 2013 while it made revisions.211
There was a successful suit in 2009 against New York’s
RGGI carbon regulation.212
An additional suit against New York’s participation in
RGGI was deflected only by procedural defenses.213
Arizona in late 2013 imposed an additional fee of
approximately $5/month on solar installations.214
In a case distinct from a somewhat similar suit on the
merits by other parties under constitutional principles in
federal court, the largest ethanol producer in the United
States successfully challenged the California Low Carbon
Fuel Standard (LCFS) rule in California state court, alleging a
failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality
Act.215

There are many legal fences ringing state methods of implementation
of incentives, which influence, at least indirectly, new energy sector business
models.

211. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509562, 2011 WL
312702 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2011) (tentative statement of decision); Lisa Weinzimer
& Geoffrey Craig, Delaying California CHG Cap-and-Trade Regime a Year Draws
Support from Stakeholders, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 11–12, available at 2011
WLNR 14216421; Joshua T. Bledsoe, California Cap and Trade Back on Track, but
Compliance Obligations Pushed from 2012 to 2013, LATHAM’S CLEAN ENERGY L. REP. (Jul. 8,
2011), http://www.cleanenergylawreport.com/environmental-and-approvals/california-cap-andtrade-back-on-track-but-compliance-obligations-pushed-from-2012-to-2013/. This delayed
the plan until 2013. Id.
212.
See Indeck Energy Sues State Questioning Legality of Regional Greenhouse
Gas Program, CLEAN TECH. BUS. REV. (Jan 11, 2015), http://solar.clean technologybusinessreview.com/news/indeck_energy_sues_state_questioning_legality_of_regional_
greenhouse_gas_program_090129; see Consent Decree, Indeck Corinth, L.P. v. David
Paterson, No. 5280-09, at 5–6 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty. Albany Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/ docs/legal_protection_pdf/consdecree.pdf.
213.
Thrun v. Cuomo, et al, No. 4358-11, 42 ELR 20132, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012);
Geoffrey Craig & Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York Participation in
RGGI, Citing Lack of Legislative Approval, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 10,
available at 2011 WLNR 14216406.
214. Craig & Roberts, supra note 213. Arizona Public Service originally sought an
amount ten times this amount. Id.
215. Poet, LLC v. California Air Resources Board, 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 (2013);
Poet argued that CARB failed to respond to numerous public comments, that it omitted
documents from the rulemaking file. Id. at 745.
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
AND THE LAW
The grid is changing. An increasing percentage of consumers will generate
their own power. The motivation for this is more a “regulatory play” than
it is based on generation cost economics. This is because self-generation
of power, even if not economic on generation costs compared to larger
facilities (smaller fossil-fired units typically have greater environmental
impacts per kWh generated), achieves double avoidances of regulatory
imposed costs:




The generator avoids all transmission, distribution, system
benefit charge, and tax costs in the retail bill for the amount
generated, which avoided fractions collectively typically
constitute more than half of the retail bill.
The generator can receive a suite of cross-subsidies in the
form of RECs, net metering credit value, system benefit
charges, carbon credits; in Massachusetts, as one example,
these are collectively worth up to 1000% more than the
value of power produced itself.

Additional deployment of renewable energy resources has measureable
significant positive public externalities:






Increasing power system reliability with more independent
points of generation.216
Creating a reliable and appropriately more mixed generation
supply diversity for the electric power system.217
Putting less pressure on the use of the aging power
distribution system by utilizing on-site private power rather
than moving more power through the regulated power
distribution system.218
Using solar PV systems that can add on-peak value to the
power transmission network with which they interconnect
by providing supply to proximately located end users,219

216. See Distributed Energy Basics, D EMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND (Jul. 6, 2013),
http://www.democraticunderground.com/112748526.
217. Id.
218. See Edward Kahn, Avoidable Transmission Cost Is a Substantial Benefit of
Solar PV, 21 ELECTRICITY J. 41, 45 (2008).
219. Id.
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although this is dependent on a case-by-case locational
determination of power flow.220
Some scholars have estimated that the value of distributed solar PV
units that sell power back to the grid results in savings to the utility system
due to not purchasing that amount of power elsewhere, saving use of
transmission and distribution capacity, eliminating risk of changes in
fossil fuel prices, and saving transmission and distribution losses of 5% to
10% in transmission—which they valued cumulatively at between $0.09
and $0.25 per kWh.221 In addition to these values to the utility system,
articles note that there are other societal benefits in environmental and
health benefits, jobs, and grid security, which increase the cumulative total
by approximately 50%.222 When combined with power sale revenues, the
total value of solar PV benefits has been estimated to be higher than the
leveled cost to install PV (e.g. $0.15 to $0.41/kWh in the U.S.).223 If that
is true, PV system owners actually cross-subsidize other ratepayers.224
But there is, as yet, no definitive calculation of costs and benefits for a
particular utility in a particular state. Subsidies for distributed generation
have been randomly afforded in many states without quantifying costs and
benefits to the grid.
There also are real costs associated with necessary greater amounts of
spinning reserve and back-up power, which impose additional costs on
maintenance of system reliability that were not there before.225 Satisfying
the California goal of having 33% of electricity supplied by renewable
resources by 2020 will cost approximately $115 billion as estimated by

220. See Tom Tiernan, Attention to Good Standby Rates Seen Key as Distributed
Generation Plays Bigger Role, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Dec. 31, 2012, at 10, available at
https://global.factiva.com. While increased solar PV installations sited near load centers
can defer substation and grid system investments, they can increase two-way power flows
and add grid management costs for voltage fluctuations and equipment overload. Id.
221. Richard Perez et al., Solar Power Generation in the U.S.: Too Expensive, or a
Bargain?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7290, 7294 (2011). The range of value that this Article
attaches to wholesale power is significantly above the average weighted price of wholesale
power transactions in the last several years and uses the distributed power value in New
York City, a location that is capacity constrained. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT
POWER, supra note 210, § 10:144.
222. See Perez, supra note 222, at 7293–94.
223. Rickerson, IEA, supra note 2, at 43 (citing Richard Perez et al., Solar Power
Generation in the US: Too Expensive, or a Bargain?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7290, 7294 (2011));
LENA HANSEN ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., A REVIEW OF SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST
STUDIES 22 (2d ed. 2013).
224. See Rickerson, supra note 2, at 43; L. BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB,
REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED
SOLAR (2013).
225. See Puga, supra note 49, at 34–35.
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the California PUC. According to PUC member, John Bohn, there should
be more honesty about these facts and costs.226An article questioned the
taxpayer and ratepayer subsidies concealed within California’s push for a
quick ramp-up of solar energy generation.
Stanford University economist Frank Wolak, an expert in the California
electricity market, said the state’s renewable energy strategy could boost
electricity rates 10% to 20%, depending on a number of factors. Potentially,
consumers’ bills could go up by 50%: “It is easily in the billions of dollars,”
he said.
Even renewable-energy advocates, such as the Bay Area-based Climate
Policy Initiative, estimates that 43 cents of every dollar of energy
produced by the Ivanpah facility will be paid for by taxpayers. But outside
experts, including Wolak, the Stanford economist, estimate that Ivanpah
power is priced at $90 to $130 per megawatt hour—three to four times the
cost of electricity in the state last year. A San Diego-based power
consultant estimated the cost of new transmission lines to reach remote
solar and wind power plants could exceed $15 billion statewide in the next
decade. Upgrading existing transmission lines would add billions more,
he said.227
In the U.S. electric power system, the costs of state wholesale power
generation incentives are not absorbed by the utilities, but are passed on
to their customer rate-payers, often through pre-approved adjustment clauses.
There was a first-of-its-kind recent Ohio action, which froze rather than
advanced renewable goals.228 The President of NRG Energy noted that
more distributed solar and wind power is forcing utilities to spread their
increasing fixed costs over fewer customers, therefore increasing the cost
of service to remaining customers.229

226. Lisa Weinzimmer & Lynn Corum, California Challenge Looks Bigger and Bigger
as Budget, Economy Woes Strain High Ambitions, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 18, 2010, at
1, 20.
227. Evan Halper et al., Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar Plants,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012 (“Taxpayers, ratepayers will fund California solar plants: A
new breed of prospectors—banks, insurers, utility companies—are receiving billions in
subsidies while taxpayer and ratepayers are paying most of the costs. Critics say it’s a ripoff.”).
228. Two states were attempting to expand definitions to include more eligible project,
as did Massachusetts previously.
229. Andrew Engblom, NRG CEO: Distributed Generation a ‘Mortal Threat to Utilities,
SNL ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2013.
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And consumers are often confronted with the lack of competitive
choices: In more than two-thirds of the states, there is no alternative for
all retail power consumers other than a monopoly utility company, resulting
in the consumer incurring any invisible additional costs associated with
state incentive mechanisms previously bulleted above.230 The California
PUC documented that most homeowners with distributed solar systems
had an average household income about twice that as the average
household.231 California preserved net metering for now, but directed the
state’s Public Utility Commission to come up with a new program by 2017
that ensures non-solar customers do not bear an unfair burden.232
In addition to consumer cross-subsidies, there is an additional cost to
the grid system of accommodating substantially more net metered
intermittent power. Adding a significant intermittent DG component,
even if load demand characteristics do not change, increases the need for
spinning reserve, the amount of fuel consumed to spin that reserve, and
other marginal costs incurred to maintain an unchanged, reliable system.233
So we need to do the numbers to move forward on what trade-offs
surround the new business model. The Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and the Edison Electric Industry (an electric utility industry trade
group), in 2014, jointly called for a new state retail rate structure to reflect
more equitable prices based on actual costs and benefits for distributed
renewable energy systems.234 The groups jointly stated that “rate designs will
continue to develop that reward customers for using electricity more
efficiently,” and an NRDC official stated that owners of rooftop solar
panels “must provide reasonable cost-based compensation for the utility
services they use.”235 Julia Hamm of the Solar Electric Power Association
identifies three ways regulators could help utilities cope with these
changes:236

230. See Retail Energy Supply Association, State by State, http://www.resausa.org/
states (showing that thirty-six states still maintain monopolies on the sale of electric power).
231. Than, supra note 6 ($91,000 as compared to California’s state average of $54,000).
232. Id.
233. See Puga, supra note 49.
234. EEI/NRDC Joint Statement To State Utility Regulators, Feb. 12, 2014,
http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_14021101a.pdf; Christopher Martin, NRDC, Utility
Group Urge Grid Payments, New Rate Structure for Rooftop Solar Users, BLOOMBERG
BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT, Feb. 12, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-02-12/nrdc-and-u-s-utilities-seek-compensation-for-rooftop-solar-cost.html.
235. See Martin, supra note 234.
236. Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for
the New Era, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2013, at 35.
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They could demand monthly infrastructure fees from solar
users, as some are now doing (to compensate for a base
amount of grid benefit afforded).
They could itemize a la carte every component of value
separately, rather than wrapping the cost of infrastructure
maintenance into usage charges, and disaggregate which
customers consume which features.
They could split energy used and consumed into separate
transactions so that all DG energy is sold to a utility before
buying back what’s needed (as is done with gross net
metering).

A value of solar tariff has previously been developed by the municipal
utility in Austin, Texas, for residential PV.237 We need to do the cost/
benefit analysis and under law reconfigure the new model and its economics
accordingly.

237. Karl R. Rábago et al., Designing Austin Energy’s Solar Tariff Using a Distributed
PV Value Calculator 5 (2012) (presented at World Renewable Energy Congress).
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